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AdvisoryMicrosoft SMS MFAretirement: what todo before February2027

Microsoft SMS MFA retirement: what to do before February 2027

The Microsoft SMS MFA retirement removes the text message and phone call options from Entra ID multifactor authentication on two dates. On February 1, 2027, Microsoft stops delivering its own SMS and voice codes for every user except Global Administrators and external users. On July 1, 2027, it stops for those two groups as well. A user whose only method is a phone number is stopped at sign-in until a passkey is registered. Microsoft's notice states that SMS and voice "are no longer positioned as secure authentication methods and will no longer be provided natively in Entra ID."

If your users started seeing a passkey prompt in September, that prompt is part of the same program: since September 1, 2026, users enabled for SMS or voice are enabled for passkeys automatically and nudged to register one, with unlimited snoozes, unless the tenant used Microsoft's temporary opt-out.

Who the SMS MFA retirement affects, and how to check

The timeline applies to public cloud tenants, including GCC. A tenant is affected if SMS or voice is enabled for anyone in its Authentication methods policy or legacy MFA settings. Self-service password reset is included, so verification by text for a reset ends on the same date.

Three details catch people out. Internal guest users follow the February 1 date, not the July 1 date for external users. The July 1 date for Global Administrators applies only while the role is active; an administrator merely eligible for it through Privileged Identity Management follows February 1. And the temporary opt-out available through the Graph API delays only the automatic passkey enablement and the registration nudges; it ends on February 1, 2027, and enforcement applies regardless.

To see who relies on a phone, go to Entra ID, then Authentication methods, then Activity. On the Registration tab, select a method under "Users registered by authentication method" to list its users; phone methods appear as Mobile phone, Alternate Mobile Phone, and Office phone. The report requires Entra ID P1 or P2 and lags by up to 36 hours. Microsoft's PowerShell script on GitHub, entra-sms-voice-usage-analyzer, reports which groups the SMS and voice policies target, not which users have no other method, so its CSV is not your migration list.

What it costs to wait

The direct cost is a help desk morning. On the retirement date, a user with only a phone number registered cannot skip the passkey prompt. A phone running iOS 17 or Android 14 or later can hold the passkey in Microsoft Authenticator, so the user can self-register. With an older phone, or no company-approved phone at all, that user needs a FIDO2 security key, and often an administrator with a Temporary Access Pass, to get signed in and registered. Count the warehouse, clinical, and front-desk staff who never installed Microsoft Authenticator.

The second cost is password resets. With phone verification gone from self-service password reset, every reset for a user whose only reset method is a phone becomes a ticket.

The third cost shows up on paperwork. Microsoft's authentication strength table places SMS and voice in the plain "Multifactor authentication" tier alongside a password, while passkeys (FIDO2), Windows Hello for Business, and multifactor certificate-based authentication meet the "Phishing-resistant MFA" tier. Our post on cyber insurance security controls covers what underwriters ask; the answer improves after this migration.

What to do now, in order

  1. Build the user list from registrations, not policy scope. Open the Mobile phone list in the Activity report and mark every user who has no second method registered. That subset is the February 1 risk. List your Global Administrators and external collaborators separately for July 1.

  2. Pick one target method per group. Users who already sign in to Windows with Windows Hello for Business have a phishing-resistant method and can keep using it. Users with a current phone get a device-bound passkey (one that stays on that phone) in Microsoft Authenticator. Shared-workstation and no-phone staff get a FIDO2 security key. For hard cases, a time-based code in Microsoft Authenticator stays supported after February 1, 2027, and does not trigger the blocking prompt; it is still phishable, and a Conditional Access policy that demands phishing-resistant sign-in will reject it, so treat it as a bridge.

  3. Configure the Passkey (FIDO2) policy. As an Authentication Policy Administrator, under Authentication methods, Policies, select Passkey (FIDO2). Opt in to passkey profiles at the banner; the opt-in cannot be reversed. Set "Allow self-service set up" to Yes; enabling the method alone leaves the Security info page unable to register one. Create a profile with Passkey types set to Device-bound and key restrictions allowing the two Microsoft Authenticator AAGUIDs (the published identifiers for its iOS and Android apps), plus a second profile for the security keys you buy (three profiles are allowed), then target your pilot group. Passkeys are included in every Entra ID edition, including Free. A user must have completed MFA within the previous five minutes to register a passkey.

  4. Enable Temporary Access Pass before you need it. Under Policies, select Temporary Access Pass, enable it, and set one-time use to True. A one-time pass must be used to complete registration within 10 minutes of sign-in, and the default lifetime is one hour. An Authentication Administrator can issue one from a user's Authentication methods page; for administrator accounts, including the emergency access accounts below, the issuer needs the Privileged Authentication Administrator role. The pass also covers lost phones and new hires.

  5. Check Conditional Access for a registration loop. A Conditional Access policy (Entra ID P1) that requires phishing-resistant authentication for all resources can block the registration it demands. Microsoft's documented fixes are to scope the policy to specific apps, or to split desktop and mobile policies and issue a Temporary Access Pass for mobile. Microsoft also documents a new exclusion, the Microsoft Authenticator Credential Registration resource, as available from November 2026 once its enterprise application is provisioned.

  6. Fix the emergency access accounts this week. An emergency access account that still verifies by phone should not wait for July. Microsoft's guidance for these accounts: a Passkey (FIDO2) security key, a different method from your daily administrator accounts, two or more accounts, cloud-only on the .onmicrosoft.com domain, excluded from Conditional Access policies that block sign-in, and tested at least every 90 days.

  7. Migrate, then shrink the policy. Migrate group by group, and remove each finished group from the SMS and Voice calls policy scope to stop the nudges. Cover self-service password reset in the same pass.

  8. Use a telephony provider only with a written reason. Since October 30, 2026, tenants with a regulatory or operational need for text or voice can configure a third-party provider through Microsoft Security Store; Soprano and Telesign are the initial providers, in private preview. Paying a carrier to keep a method Microsoft calls among the most vulnerable available today is a decision to document, not a default.

When to get help

If you cannot say how many users have a phone number as their only MFA method, or your tenant has shared workstations, no-phone staff, or Conditional Access policies nobody has reviewed, book a 30-minute intro call at padlocktech.com/#contact to see if our cloud services team can help.

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